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THE BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF RISING EMPLOYEE
RETIREMENTS SYSTEM COSTS*
ROY W. BAHL AND BERNARD JUMP

of public employees seem less related to the
w HILE the rising level of expenditures

for the provision of services by statestructure of the city population than to the
and local governments has been the subjectrelative wages of public vs. private sector
of considerable study by economists, the employees and to increases in the cost of
rising cost of providing these services has
living. There has been little study of the
seldom been studied. There are two main
factors underlying increases in retirement

reasons why the expenditure requirements
system and other fringe benefit costs, but
it seems unlikely that these are especially
been given primary attention: the first is
related to changing population characteristhat reasonable cross-section and time series tics. Finally, the increases in new-labor costs
data for expenditures by function of gov- materials, equipment, supplies - are apt
ernment are readily available. The secondto be best explained by inflation and by
is that the general concern over rising state
changes in the public sector production proand local government expenditures has
cess. If this critique of conventional Statetypically been with the relationship betweenLocal expenditure studies is correct, then
expenditures and the characteristics of the
the results of these analyses do not give
local population, i.e., the analysis has been
much help in understanding why per capita
oriented toward how governments actingexpenditures vary across states or in forefor voters reveal preferences for public
casting and planning the increase in governgoods through budget decisions.1 For ex-ment expenditures. Hence there is good
reason to turn attention to the cost side.
ample, common hypotheses tested are that
the level of per capita expenditures by The intent in this paper is to deal with
state and local governments is a positive
the budget implications to state and local
function of urbanization, or that per capita
governments of one component of rising
city government expenditures for police
government costs - public employee retireservices are higher where there are greater
ment systems.
concentrations of the poor. Whether or not Our specific objectives here are to present
these underlying explanatory factors cause
the available empirical evidence on increased
the different components of expendituresretirement
system costs and to attempt idenwages and salaries, numbers of employees,
tification, if not measurement, of the factors

rather than the cost side of the issue has

which underlie such increases. In this conpensions and fringe benefits, non-labor costs

- to rise at differential rates has not beentext, we hope to take a first step toward
rigorously studied.
assessing the future budgetary implications
The events of recent years in the public
of employee retirement system costs.
employment field give cause for criticizing The paucity of research in this area is
this demand oriented expenditure approach
such that there is no generally accepted
as inadequate. There would seem little reamodel for the analysis of public employee
son to believe that expenditures grow priretirement systems costs.2 Moreover, data
marily because of the changing structure of

city populations. For example, the salary2For examples of some efforts to project the

gains won at the bargaining table on behalf
future costs of specific retirement programs see
Claudia Devita Scott, Forecasting Local Govern♦This paper is an outgrowth of a larger re-ment Spending (Washington, D.C.: The Urban

search project on public employment supported Institute, 1972), pp. 61-64 ; and Office of Budget
in the Metropolitan Studies Program of the Max-and Financial Management, Issue Analysis: An
well School of Syracuse University by the FordAid to Program Decision-Making in Urban

Foundation.

Government (Washington, D.C.: District of

1For a discussion of the general issue see JesseColumbia Government, 1972), pp. 7-20. The
Burkhead and Jerry Miner, Public Expenditureslatter of these is an excellent example of what
(Chicago: Aldine and Atherton, Inc., 1971), can be done in the way of forecasting costs when
the full actuarial records are available.
Chapter 9-

479
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son with benefitour
costs of private industry
are severely limited.3 Accordingly,
employees.
Althoughto
the survey report does
method will be to tailor our
approach
not identify
costs for
the kinds of empirical evidence
which
is specific cities and

easily marshalled in the context
a crossdespiteof
serious
flaws such as a low sample
particularly for large cities and
section analysis of state and response
local governcities in the
Northeast where benefits are
ment employee retirement system
costs.
be most costly, some of the reIn the following section, a thought
brieftoreview
sults are
important
of existing studies is presented.
We
then enough to summarize
here. Among theemconclusions reached were:
consider the problems with measuring
(1) fringe
paid to municipal employee retirement system costs
and benefits
explore
ployees
are moreconcostly than those furnished
the serious data inadequacies
which
strain research in this area. Section IV is
to private industry employees;5 (2) municipal employee benefit costs are equivalent to
limited to analysis of state and local gov28 per cent and nearly 34 per cent
ernment retirement system costs and between
inof pay for time actually worked, depending
cludes a rough presentation of trends and

on the job classification, and (3) pensions
a crude model designed to explain inter-

state variations in such costs. We conclude

and social security costs account for 40 per
with a brief note on the important policycent of total benefit costs, making them the
implications of continued increases in re- most costly benefit by a margin of more

tirement system costs.

than two to one.

II. Previous Studies

Aggregate benefit cost estimates have also
been developed in case studies of Philadel-

The research that has been conducted on

phia and New York. Among the conclusions reached in the Philadelphia study6

this subject - mostly in the form of limited was that the expenditures for benefits in
cross-section investigation or case studies for 1971 were equivalent to more than 33 per

particular cities - definitely suggests that cent of total salary expenditures, up from

retirement costs are a large and rapidly about 25 per cent in 1966. Also, pension

growing component of state and municipal and social security outlays alone accounted
expenditures. Among the most noteworthy for about 35 per cent of all benefit outlays
in the cross-section category is a National including pay for time not worked such as

League of Cities report issued in 197 2. 4 vacations and leaves. The New York City

Purporting to be the first national survey study7 revealed a pattern of benefit costs
of municipal employee benefits, the report much like that found for Philadelphia, i.e.,
classifies its estimates in a variety of ways 1971 benefit expenditures as a percentage
including the share of costs attributable to
each of several major benefits; comparisons 5Beyond pointing out the flaws in the study,
of benefit costs per employee according to we are unable to say whether this conclusion
job classification, population size group and could be generalized for all municipal employees.
geographic location of city; and a compari- But it is important to note as we do below that,
according to the Commerce Department's comprehensive series on employer expenditures for

3The problems of devising an appropriate
supplements to wages and salaries, the average
model would be formidable even if appropriate
cost of supplements for private industry employ-

data were available. For a comprehensive discusees had consistently exceeded the cost of supplesion of the complexities of accounting for the
ments furnished to state and local government

cost of a retirement system, see Thomas P.

Bleakney, Retirement Systems for Public Employ-

ees (Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,
1972), Chapter 5.

employees.

Pennsylvania Economy League (Eastern Division), Philadelphia Municipal Employee Benefits

Compared with Employee Benefits of Private
4Labor-Management Relations Service of the
Companies in the Area , Report No. 361 (PhilaNational League of Cities, United States Condelphia, Pennsylvania: The League, 1972).
ference of Mayors, National Association of
Counties, First National Survey of Employee
7Bernard Jump, "Trends in State and Local
Benefits for Full-Time Personnel of U.S. Munici- Government Expenditures on Employee Fringe
palities, Special Report: A Spotlight on City Benefits: An Exploratory Report, " Northeast
Employee Benefits (Washington, D.C.: Labor- Regional Science Review , Vol. 3, 1973, pp. 149155.
Management Relations Service, n.d.).
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completes many
years time
of employment,
he
of salary expenditures
for
worke
in fact
accumulating
future
claimseven
on
amounted to aboutis43
per
cent.
And

benefits each year he works.
Hence,
the
more than in Philadelphia,
New
York's

benefit outlays were
employer
dominated
is accruing pension
by
obligations
the tocost
the employee
although the employee
of employee pension
programs
andmay
socia
be eligible to
receive benefits
until he 50
security, the sharenot
being
greater
than
retires. Ifcost
the employer
paying fully for
per cent of the total
ofis benefits
in
benefits earned
simultaneous with their acevery year from 1966
to 1971.

crual, literature
this means that money provides
is being accuAlthough the thin

little more than a hint of the nature of

mulated at a rate sufficient, when invested

pension and fringe benefit cost trends,8 it at interest over the employee's working
does suggest that the budgetary implicationcareer, to build a fund large enough to pay
of furnishing fringe benefits to state and the full pension liability. In essence, the
local government employees are substantial. true annual cost to the employer is the present value of the future retirement benefits
III. Measurement Problems

that an employee earned during the year

and for which, ultimately, the employer will
The constraint to more, and better, analyhave to pay.

sis of the budgetary implications of risingUnderstatement of true annual costs for
employee retirement system costs is the abretirement programs reflects either undersence of appropriate data. For purposes of
funding or no funding at all. With respect
such analysis, the basic measurement probto the latter, some state and local governlem is one of defining the most appropriate
ments explicitly provide retirement benefits
measure of such costs. Ideally, we would
on a pay-as-you-go basis. This means that
like to measure the level of employer conno employer-financed fund is accumulated
tributions that would be required to mainas liabilities accrue, and the employer simtain actuarially sound and fully-funded
ply pays benefits as employees become eligipension systems.9 Although an employee
ble to draw them by charging them against
does not begin drawing benefits until he
current expenditures. Although explicit
pay-as-you-go
arrangements are rare,10 it is
8As noted in a 1970 Bureau of Labor Statistics
sometimes alleged that the practice of unstudy of employee compensation in private indusderfunding is not uncommon.11 Unfortutry: "Data on the compensation of public employees, other than those working for the Federal
nately, the allegation cannot easily be tested
Government, are scarce. Information for this inbecause,
creasingly important sector of the economy will

as noted above, appropriate data

are not readily available for a broad selecbe in growing demand." Alvin Bauman, "Mea-

tion of pension systems. Without access to
suring Employee Compensation in U.S. Industry,"

Monthly Labor Review, October 1970, p. 23.the detailed records of a pension system it
Although the demand has not lessened in the
is nearly impossible to determine whether
ensuing years, the scarcity of such data appears
to be just about as severe now as in 1970.
10Massachusetts is the only state that uses this
°Even this notion is not without its ambiguities.
approach for virtually all state employees. Local
Consider, for example, what happens to a retiregovernments in Massachusetts also use pay-asment program with no unfunded liabilities when

you-go financing. Among the major cities that use
benefit improvements are granted to present mempay-as-you-go to some degree are Indianapolis,
bers with the improvement being made retroactive
Pittsburgh, Seattle, and Washington, D.C.
or applicable to all prior as well as future service.
Immediately there is created a liability for which 11 Labor-Management Relations Service of the

National League of Cities, United States Conferthe employer has made no payments. Sound actuence of Mayors, National Association of Counties,
arial practice permits such liabilities to be funded

or amortized in a matter somewhat analogousFirst
to National Survey of Employee Benefits for
Full-Time Personnel of U.S. Municipalities , Specharging off a capital item, but there is a concial Report: A Spotlight on City Employee Benesiderable range of opinion regarding what confits , p. 3; Bleakney, Retirement Systems for Public
stitutes the appropriate period over which the
Employees , p. 14; and Advisory Commission on
cost should be spread. Generally speaking though,
Intergovernmental Relations, City Financial Emerthe shorter the period selected the more conserva-

gencies : The Intergovernmental Dimension
tively funded the system. See Bleakney, Retire(Washington, D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., 1973), pp.
ment Systems for Public Employees , pp. 89-92,
121.
54-56, 64-66.
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a program is being fully funded.12
the is not to say that the onus
This But
discussion
matter is of extreme importance
inproviding
terms of
for
data to evaluate the budgetary

future expenditures because, if
substantial
implications
of pension costs should fall
underfunaing has been the practice,
exclusively this
on the federal government. In
will mean that the government
fact, involved
appropriate information provision rewill eventually be faced with sharply
in- of the federal government
sponsibilities
would
be more in the area of makcreased employer pension costs
- seem
eventoif
there are no increases in employment,
sala- statistics available. Clearly,
ing comparative
ries, or pension benefit packages.13
most of the detailed analysis of the real
As already noted, data covering
pension
costs
costsof
to state and local governments
will necessarily
state and local government employee
retire- have to come from state
and local
government
offices.16
ment programs and other benefits
are
very
Theresources
potentially are many advantages to
scarce. Interestingly, the principal
available
of comprehensive information making
about the
fi- the data needed to subject
nances of states and local governments,
the to more scrutiny and pubretirement costs

Census Bureau's annual Government Fi-

licity than they customarily receive. Govern-

ments
may be less willing to commit
nance series and its quinquennial Census
of
Governments,14 include information about
themselves to providing a too-expensive
only one employee benefit - retirement
benefit package without recognizing the

programs. Unfortunately, even these budgetary
data
implications of doing so, if taxwill be aware of such a situation.
are seriously deficient for purposes ofpayers
asjurisdictions where the retirement benesessing future budgetary effects because In
they
fits furnished to public employees are clearly
are not in a form appropriate for determining the true current or future costs associinadequate relative to those furnished to
ated with providing retirement benefits
to public employees and to private inother
employees presently on the payroll.15 dustry employees, the availability of more
complete and comprehensive information
12Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
regarding costs could be useful to repreRelations, City Financial Emergencies : The Intersentatives of public employees in bargaining
governmental Dimensions , p. 54.
for improvements in retirement benefits.
13The Advisory Commission on IntergovernMore generally, employee representatives
mental Relations is sufficiently alarmed "that
could use such data to inform taxpayers of
underfunded, locally administered retirement sysexactly the long-term tax cost of various
tems pose an emerging threat to the financial
health of local governments" to recommendbenefit
that
packages and to argue more point-

the states require both regular actuarial valuations
edly

about the relative cost of increased

of all local systems and "realistic funding based
benefit packages vs. the alternative use of
on such valuation." Advisory Commission on

local government resources. Hence, to the
Intergovernmental Relations, City Financial Emer-

gencies: The Intergovernmental Dimension extent
, pp.
that the government officials respon-

6-7.

sible for such decisions, taxpayers, and union representatives are all aware in advance
Employee-Retirement Systems of State and Local
of the budgetary significance of benefit proGovernments (Annual), Series GF (Washington,
posals, the less likely they are of locking
D.C.: U.S.G.P.O.) and U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments, 1972, Vol. 6, Topi- themselves into a package that exceeds what
14See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Finances of

cal Studies , No. 1 , Employee Retirement Systems

of State and Local Governments (Washington,tal basis for predicting costs. A very good discusD.C.: U.S.G.P.O., 1973).
sion of these matters is found in Bleakney,

15A complete identification of the nature ofRetirement Systems for Public Employees, Chapter
5.

the data that would be required to assess the

budgetary effects of retirement programs would ^Implementation of the ACIR recommendation
go beyond the scope of this paper. But in general
that states should require regular actuarial valuawhat is needed are records of a given retirementtions of all local systems (see p. 8, n. 2 above)
system with respect to such factors as employ-would be a great help. However, we would go
ment terminations, disabilities, retirements, deaths,
further by recommending that all retirement sysinvestment yields, and salary and employment in-tems, state-operated as well as locally-operated,
creases. From these, an actuary could develop the
be required to conduct regular actuarial valuaactuarial assumptions that serve as the fundamen-tions.
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is reasonable in the context
of has
the
total compensation
beenoverall
greater in the

fiscal situation.17

public sector throughout the 1962-1972
period. It is interesting to note, however,

IV. State and Local Government Retire-

ment System Costs

that supplements to wages and salaries,
which include most fringe benefits, re-

mained higher in the private sector, in the

One general approach to exploring the
absolute and as a percentage of wages

trend and structure of pension costs is to
earned. One interpretation of this trend is
examine time series and cross-section data
that bargaining in the private sector placed
on state and local government aggregates.
more emphasis on supplements than did
While such aggregation hides the wide varibargaining in the public sector. At any rate,
ations that exist both between and within
for every one dollar increase in total comstates, it does give some rough basis for
pensation granted in 1972, the amount for
assessing future budgetary implications. supplements was 13.0 cents in the public
sector and 15.5 cents in the private sector.

Trends in Public Employee Costs: 1962-

1972

Public Employee Pension Costs: Trends and
Causes
The growth in state and local government
employee compensation has been consider-While the trends indicated in Table 1
able in recent years, in the absolute and in
suggest the growth in total employee supcomparison with the private sector, i.e., in
plemental benefits, the data presented do

1972 the average compensation of public
not separate expenditures on retirement

sector employees was larger than the averprograms for expenditures for other fringe
age received by private sector employees
benefits. The data in Table 2 describe, sep(see Table l).18 Moreover, the growth in
arately, expenditures for employee retirement programs over the 1962-1972 period.19
17According to the ACIR, "in the late 1950'sIt becomes immediately clear from these data
and early 19¿0's . . . many cities [in Ohio] fell
several years behind in their payments to policethat while payroll expenditures as a share of
and fire pensioners." Advisory Commission ongeneral expenditures were declining very
Intergovernmental Relations, City Financial Emer-slightly during the decade, retirement exgencies : The Intergovernmental Dimension , p. 66.
penditures were increasing relative to total
That such a calamity is more than just theoretically possible, having happened so recently inpayroll outlays.
one of the wealthier states, would seem to con- This implies that governments apparently
stitute very persuasive support for our suggestionhave been more willing to grant increases in
that it is in the best interest of public employeesretirement benefits than they have been to
just as much as the taxpayers' to be certain that
their retirement programs be fiscally reasonablegrant wage and salary increments. Alternaand soundly financed. Indeed, it can be arguedtively, but not inconsistently, it could be
that this is a major justification for avoiding
pay-as-you-go methods of financing retirementemployees are often better paid than private
benefits. See Bleakney, Retirement Systems forindustry employees holding similar jobs. See

Stephen H. Perloff, "Comparing Municipal SalaPublic Employees , pp. 114-115.
ries with Industry and Federal Pay," Monthly
18It is difficult to know how much to make of
Labor Review, October 1971, pp. 46-50. Also see
this, though some analysts think that such com-Arnold M. Zack, "Meeting the Rising Cost of
parisons "provide significant indications of the
Public Sector Settlements," Monthly Labor Removements in the two sectors." B. U. Ratchford,
view, May 1973, p. 39, where it is argued that,
"Recent Changes in Public Pay Policies," Nationalbecause public sector wages have begun to exceed
Tax Journal , Vol. XXV, December 1972, p. 531. private sector wages, "standards of proof offered
Since the available data are so highly aggregated
we cannot determine whether average compensa-

public sector factfinders have switched from com-

parability data based on superior private sector
tion is larger and growing faster in the publiccompensation to comparability data now based
sector because average compensation for com-largely on the public sector, thus threatening a
parable job classifications is growing faster orself-serving spiral of intragovernmental and interbecause the public sector has a relatively highergovernmental wage comparisons."
concentration of employees in the higher-skilled
and better-paid job classifications. Both may be 19Unlike the data in Table 1 which are for
true. The least that we can say is that there iscalendar years, data in Table 2 are for fiscal
some independent corroboration that municipal years ending June 30.
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retirement standard
living so that we
can
inferred that employees
haveofpressed
mor
see no justification for
automatically
brandvigorously for improvements
in
retiremen
benefits than foring
wage
and
salary
gains
each instance
of retirement
benefit
imEither way, the data
provement
lend
as merely
some
another
support
instance of t
a thesis that state political
and local
governments
expediency
at the expense of the
Surely
public officials (and tax-in
are more willing totaxpayer.
grant
compensation
creases which arepayers)
more
have the
easily
responsibility
"hidden
of compenfrom the taxpayersating
and/or
public employees
which
adequately.
may no
Moreover,
we are not arguing that politihave to be fully paid
for immediately,
than
they are to grant wage
cians whoand
agree to
salary
pension improvements
increase
usuallyand
know the
full cost implicationspay
of
which are both visible
immediately

the concessions. Indeed,
we are
assuming
able in full. As Wellington
and
Winter

have observed:

that often in the past decisions were made
without careful estimation and considera-

Where pensions are concerned, moreover, tion of the probable costs involved. And
major concessions may be politically although such "ignorance" may sometimes
tempting since there is no immediate be a convenience to the politician concerned
impact on the taxpayer or the city budget. with reelection, it seems excessively cynical
Whereas actuarial soundness would be
to assume that most public officials would
insisted on by a profit-seeking entity like
not draw the line well before a concession
a firm, it may be a secondary concernwould
to
"condemn a city to future impoverpoliticians whose conduct is determined
ishment." But if it is correct that too few
by relatively short-run considerations.
governments have systematically evaluated
The impact of failing to adhere to actuthe long-term budgetary implications of
arial principles will frequently fall upon
increases in retirement packages, and that
a different mayor and a different city
the data necessary for such evaluation aren't
council. In those circumstances, conceseasily available anyway, it also seems reasions that condemn a city to future
sonable to suggest that it is in such areas
impoverishment may not seem intolerof relatively high ignorance (of the longerable.20

term consequences) and low visibility (to

the taxpayer) that we should expect to find
In truth, the notion of political temptathe most rapid increases.
tion or opportunism referred to by WellingIn any event, several tangible factors
ton and Winter is so subjective and slippery

might explain the relative and absolute
that it is probably impossible to devise a

growth in retirement costs, including higher
generally acceptable test for determining the

salaries, more employees, and retirement
degree to which it has been responsible for

benefit improvements - in the form of
the rapid rise in retirement costs.21 We

either larger payments at retirement (relacertainly are sufficiently convinced of the
tive to a given final average salary and/or
social value of providing retired employees
to years of service at time of retirement)
with enough income to maintain their preor a larger share of the total cost of a given

benefit package being taken on by the

20Harry H. Wellington and Ralph K. Winter,

employer.
Jr., The Unions and the Cities (Washington,
Assuming that some real effort is being
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971), pp.
19-20. Quoted in Advisory Commission on Inter- made to maintain an actuarially sound regovernmental Relations, City Financial Emergen-tirement system, it follows virtually autocies : The Intergovernmental Dimension, p. 64.
For another reflection of the view that long-runmatically that total employer expenditures
costs of fringe benefits should receive greaterwill increase as employment increases. And
consideration in negotiations, see Zack, Monthlyeven if employment remains unchanged,
Labor Review , May 1973, p. 40.
retirement expenditures per employee
21Moreover, we wonder about the assumption (hence total governmental expenditures as

that actuarial soundness is so axiomatic for

well) will rise when salaries rise and when

business firms. The recent congressional revelabenefits are improved. As may be seen from
tions about private industry pension problems
Table 2, while employment grew at greater
would suggest otherwise.
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we may be able to
understand
why costs exp
than 4 per cent annually
and
payroll
for particular
states would
rise. The at
ap- 6 p
ditures per employee
(FTE)
grew
proach taken
here is decade
strictly empirical,
and
cent annually during
the
ending
the goal is only to describe the per
structureemplo
of
1972, retirement expenditures
variations in retirement
costs. To rate
(FTE) grew at aninterstate
average
annual

7.2

per

cent

this, we
first examine
the means
and
and do
by
1972
the
addition

from

employer
andeffect
employees
should have a positive
because of
programs.23
the expected higher level of benefits in

variations of those
measureable
characterisone employee required,
on
the
average,
tics of state retirement
systems andThis
then
employer contribution
of $639.
ra
turn to a simple
correlation analysis among
growth in government
retirement
expen
these characteristics and a set of factors
tures per employee (FTE) is consistent w
thought
to influence their levels.
the suggestion that
substantial
benefit i
provements were granted22
-basis,
both
direc
On a national, a priori
we might
as increments to benefit
payments
mad
consider the following
as factors affecting
retirees and indirectly
as increases
interstate variations
in government retire-in t
employer's share of
contributions
ment total
system costs.24
Per Capita Income

quired

fund

retirement

Interstate Variations

high income states and because the expected
greater union strength in high income states

would probably call forth higher governThe pattern of interstate variations in ment contribution rates. Urba7iization and
state-local government retirement system Population Size should exert a positive cost

expenditures may give some additional evi- influence for the same reasons, and perhaps
dence as to the reasons for higher or lower also because the larger and more highly
costs. That is, if we identify the factors urbanized states may have been the most
underlying cost differences between states, hard pressed fiscally and therefore, have
granted large retirement benefits in lieu

22Though even without benefit improvements of increased wage benefits. Finally, the
it is possible that a given percentage increase in Union Strength 25 is expected to strongly
salary will require a greater percentage increase

in employee contribution. See Bernard Jump, affect the government retirement cost level

New York City Pensions , A Report of the Max- by contributing to a government's willing-

well Research Project on the Public Finance of ness to provide a better (more costly)
New York City (New York, N.Y.: The Tem- benefit package as well as a higher govern-

porary Commission to Make a Study of the
Governmental Operation of the City of New ment contribution percentage.
York, 1972), p. 37.
The characteristics of retirement systems
23For all state and local governments combined, studied here are the percentage distribution
the government, i.e., employer, share of total gov- of contributions from the government, emernment plus employee contributions grew from ployees, and investment earnings, and the
59.4 per cent in 1962 to 62.8 per cent in 1972.
(U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Govern- dollar level per member of each of these
ments, 1972, Vol. 6, . . . Employee Retirement components. In addition, we examine govSystems of State and Local Governments , p. 10.) ernment retirement costs as a per cent of
But these figures may understate the extent of payroll expenditures and system enrollment
the shift in required shares because many retirement systems permit their members to make as a per cent of total state-local government
voluntary , contributions so as to receive even employment.
higher benefits upon retirement and, if the em-

ployer's plan is appropriately structured, to shelter
24The underlying theoretical model and raincome from immediate taxation. To the extent
tionale for the choice of these variables is spelled
that these voluntary employee contributions have

out in our unpublished paper "A Theory of

been growing in the past decade, then the true
State and Local Government Retirement Cost

obligatory share of required contributions falling
Increases" (1974).
on government employees has grown even more
than the above figures suggest. (For an explana- 25Measured here as the per cent of the nontion of how one of the New York City's retireagricultural labor force which is unionized. We
assume that where private sector unionism is
ment programs actually make voluntary contribu-

tions a "bargain," see Jump, New York Citystrong, so too will be the public employee

Pensions , p. 44.

unions.
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urbanizedof
and unionized
From the means and coefficients
varia- states where the
level ofcolumn
income is higher.
tion26 (shown in the far right
of

Someretirement
interesting features about the interTable 3), it may be seen that
workings
of the various state-local syscontributions average $1180 nal
per
member27
tems are also
evident
from the data in Table
with the government, employee,
and
earnIt would
appear
that25
government contriings contributions averaging3. 44,
31,
and
butions are substitutes
for both employee
per cent respectively. It is especially
interandthat
earnings
contributions,
esting to note from these data
the
rela- i.e., where government contributions
are relatively high
tive variation in total contributions
per
both employee
and earnings shares
member is about four times(low),
greater
than
are relativelyand
low (high)
. At the same time,
the variation in per capita income
two
however, employee
earnings shares tend
times greater than the variation
in and
per
to be complimentary,
i.e., where one is high
capita general expenditures.28
This sugboth tend tothe
be high (low). Togests that other factors tend (low),
to reinforce
gether,and
these two
patterns may constitute
tendency for higher income
higher
indirect
supportretirefor the notion that underspending states to have greater
total
funding is not uncommon. For example, in
ment contributions per member.
the between
extreme case ofrea true pay-as-you-go
The pattern of relationship
system in which so-calledis
government contirement system and state characteristics
tributions go indirectly
to pay benefits due
evidenced in the simple correlations
among
government contributions would
these variables (see Table 3).retirees,
The the
relatively
add nothing
to the assets
of the systems and,
high correlations observed here
suggest
that

hence,a nothing
to the
earnings to be obone might be able to explain
great
deal

tained from invested assets. As such a system matured in terms of the number of
retirees relative to the number of working
and in the level of government costs per
member. These data show that total contri-members, it should follow that government
contributions would increase relative to
butions per member tend to be significantly
employee contributions and, because earnlower where the employee share is higher,
ings were being derived only from accuand significantly higher where per capita
mulating employee contributions that were
incomes, urbanization, and the level of unbeing invested, it should likewise follow
ion strength are higher. Following the nothat government contributions would intion that the employee share is the crucial
crease relative to earnings. A priori, it is
variable in analyzing the level of governnot obvious why such a pattern would
ment costs, these data show that where the
where a system was fully-funded
employee share of total contributionsemerge
is
and the employing government contributed
lower, the state will tend to be more highly
its full share of retirement costs as they
urbanized, unionized, and have a higher

of the interstate variation in the level of

per member retirement system contributions,

accrued. In fact, what should occur as a
fully-funded system matures is that earnevidence by any means, it suggests the

income level. While this isn't conclusive

ings on invested assets should account for a
hypothesis that in the more affluent and
growing
share of the sum of employee plus
industrialized states, e.g., the Northeast, the
government plus earnings contributions.
public employee receives a greater retirement contribution on his behalf, in total,There would not seem to be any logical
reason for the substantial positive correlaand pays less for it. From the point of view

tion
of the government, these data suggest
a between the employee and earnings

shares of total contributions if most systems
higher level of expenditures in more highly
were fully-funded and employers were contributing full costs as they accrued. At any
26The standard deviation as a per cent of the

moment in time there are söme systems

mean.

where the government employer and the
27Unweighted average statewide contribution
employees tend to share, retirement costs
per member.
28The coefficient of variation in general expen-

ditures per capita is .27.

more or less equally and there are other

systems where the employer absorbs a rela-
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V. Conclusions
tively large share of the burden
of providing benefits. In any given system,
From anhowever,
enumeration of the important
where full funding is the practice,
total
issues to bethe
resolved
in the analysis of reannual addition to accumulated
assets
and,
tirement system costs, it becomes clear that
consequently, the incremental
fiscal earnings
economists and
obother scholars of state
tained when employer and and
employee
local finance conhave devoted too little

tributions are invested, should
not
vary
attention to
the budgetary
implications of
depending on how the costpublic
is divided
beemployee retirement
programs. Moretween employer and employee.
It available
shouldaggregate
be
over, the
data covering
equally true that there would
statebe
andno
localsignifiretirement system costs may
cant positive correlation between
employee
not permit
a full evaluation of the bud-

and earnings shares, unless
the
usual and
getary
implications.
predominant arrangement required
emStill, data that
that are
available indicate that
ployees pay the overwhelming
majority
of
most state
and local governments
are spendthe cost of their pensions ing
with
the
result
steadily increasing amounts on employee
that employee contributions
accountprograms
for the
retirement
- in terms of both
bulk of income-yielding assets.
Since
the
dollar amounts
and as
a proportion of total
weight of available evidence
suggests
that
wage
and salary payments.
The considerable
few, if any, systems require
employees
budgetary
implicationsto
of this trend suggest
bear so large a proportion
of
thestudy
cost,
itfactors underlying
that
careful
of the

seems plausible that the observed
such increase relation
is called for.

between employee and earnings
shares
A cross-section
analysisis
of state-local govyet another indication of widespread
emernment retirement
costs presented here
ployer underfunding. That suggests
is to say,
iflevel
govthat the
of government reernments generally were contributing
tirement costs pertrue
member tends to be
costs as they accrue, the employee
share
of
higher in states
where
income is higher,

contributions would be less relative to both

urbanization is greater, and union strength
the government and the earnings shares of is greater. These greater government costs
total contributions than is shown by the data are apparently a result of both a greater

examined here.

level of per member benefits and a larger
government contribution percentage.
beled as speculative for, as stated earlier, There is need for further analysis of the
the data used in this study do not lend
budgetary implications of retirement costs,
and for identification and measurement of
themselves to a definitive analysis of the
degree to which underfunding characterizes
the underlying determinants of increases in
state-local retirement systems. But the evithese costs. Such study would seem an essendence is sufficient to demonstrate clearly
tial ingredient to government officials and
the need for better data and analysis union
of
leaders developing an understanding
state and local government employee reof the effects of public employee benefit
tirement costs.
demands on the taxpayer.
For now these observations must be la-
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